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Abstract
National self-determination movements are ubiquitous social attempts of one regional or ethnic
community to gain independence from a larger nation-state. These movements, although founded
on democratic ideals, have the potential to disrupt the democratic process and drastically change
international order. In the following paper, I first examine national self-determination
movements, as a whole, from a theoretical perspective. In order to more critically analyze them, I
take the case of Catalonia and its relationship with the Spanish national government, closely
following the movement’s economic, cultural, and political claims to independence. Finally, I
conclude my study by explaining Catalonia’s movement in the context of similar movements
around the world in order to identify the most significant obstacles that said movements face, as
well as what actions or conditions may be necessary in order to achieve internationally
recognized sovereignty.
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Introduction
Reacting to Southern secession from the United States in 1861, President Abraham
Lincoln posed the question of the validity and implications of secession in democracies:
It presents the question, whether discontented individuals… [can] break up their
Government… It forces us to ask: ‘Is there, in all republics, this inherent, and fatal
weakness?’ ‘Must a government, of necessity, be too strong for the liberties of its own
people, or too weak to maintain its own existence?’ (Nelson 2019).
In making these statements during a special session before Congress, Lincoln introduced a
certain dichotomy between a democracy’s need to honor the right to choice of its citizens and its
need to deny, to a certain degree, that very same right in order to maintain stability and
sovereignty. While the American Civil War ultimately resolved this question in favor of the
United States, the theories which lay behind both arguments are still relevant in modern society.
Democratic forms of secession, or “national self-determination,” as it is called, base their
claims on the theoretical right of an individual or group to control their destiny, including
decisions over the form of government. There have been many cases of political movements
advocating for national self-determination, including some that are present even to this day in
such places as Canada, Israel, India, and many more areas across the globe (Moore 2003).
One of these movements is that which is currently occurring in Catalonia, Spain. News of
this movement reached international headlines when Catalonian political leaders held a public
referendum on October 1, 2017 to determine if they should declare themselves independent from
the rest of Spain (O’Sullivan 2019). Considering that these protests were able to reach
international audiences, the fate of the Catalonian independence movement could very well
establish significant precedents in terms of the future of national self-determination and
democratic sovereignty as a whole.
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Given the importance of this event, I will be investigating the cases for and against
Catalonian secession from theoretical, cultural, economic, and political standpoints. More
specifically, the analysis makes the following claims. Firstly, the Catalonian self-determination
movement found its roots in a wide variety of issues including culture and history; however, the
driving force in pushing people to actively promote the independence movement was primarily
economic. Secondly, the movement generated international support from many groups but did
not receive outright support from official governments because it is seen as politically
unfavorable. Lastly, the movement provoked members of far-right parties and, inadvertently, led
to increased support for parties against Catalonian independence and even the Generalitat of
Catalonia.
Literature Review
National Self-Determination: A Theoretical Approach
In the analysis of Catalonian national self-determination, it is imperative to understand
the forces and theories behind secession movements in general. Perhaps the most relevant
political theories in this debate come from the idea of national sovereignty. Jean-Jacques
Rousseau is credited as being one of the first to define sovereignty in terms of a collective people
as opposed to an individual person, entity, or other element of a Hobbesian Leviathan (Noone
1970). As such, his line of thinking led the way for the modern arguments that the concept of a
“nation” can be thought of as a group of many individuals who share some common identity. In
fact, many scholars in political science have come to recognize a few characteristics for
determining what is or is not a nation, five of which are noted and explained by Margalit and Raz
(1990). The first of these is that sovereign groups must share some kind of culture defining
traditional activities, cuisine, social relationships, language, etc. Second, these cultural elements
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must be strong enough that individuals born into these groups or introduced later on become
socialized into adopting the culture or otherwise assimilating. The third and fourth characteristics
posit that membership to the group is 1) recognized by other members of the group and 2) affects
the individual’s understanding of his or her own identity. Finally, membership within the group
comes from a sense of belonging, not achievement. In summary, groups that are typically
recognized as nations in the international community and therefore eligible to possess
sovereignty are cultural groups who actively identify with, recognize, and socialize into a
collective sense of being.
However, while the above is typically thought of as the more internationally accepted
definition of sovereignty (Koskenniemi 2008), this is by no means without its problems. The
understanding that a “nation” is defined as a social and cultural group can be taken to extreme
interpretations. As we can see in modern movements, the question of national self-determination
inside of internationally recognized nations complicates world order. Similar to other types of
“slippery slope” arguments, some theorists worry that allowing nations within current states to
form their own forms of government will quickly lead to many new states, which could then
break into even more states from there, expanding exponentially and without limitation.
In the American Civil War, for example, President Lincoln posed his “Russian Doll
Theory” in this way, “If a minority… will secede rather than submit, they make a precedent
which, in turn, will divide them and ruin them; for a minority of their own number will secede
from them whenever a majority refuses to be controlled by such minority” (Lindsay and
Wellman 2003). The overlying idea is that even though self-determination is a democratic value,
too much of it causes the inevitable breakdown of democracies faced with disputes and thereby
destroys democratic values in the long run.
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Additionally, the subjective understanding that a nation is a cultural group is by no means
the only definition of a “nation.” A nation, in more objective terms, can also be thought of as any
group with two concrete characteristics. The first is that the governing body is the sole owner
and controller of legal force. In modern states, for example, this would mean that nationally
recognized executive bodies, such as the police or the military, are able to use certain degrees of
force and violence that other citizens are not. The second characteristic is that a nation must be
recognized by the international community as legitimate.
Naturally, there have been a number of scholars and governing bodies that have
attempted to reconcile this issue and define some sort of limitation to self-determination. At first
glance, the United Nations Charter appears to offer some form of support for national selfdetermination. Article 1(2) posits that one of the primary purposes of the UN is to ensure
“respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples,” and later reinforces
this in Article 55 using the same phrasing (Quine 1998). In this regard, the idea and
acknowledgement of self-determination is quite literally written into the founding documents of
the international community.
However, precedents among seceding nations (except those which were former colonies)
have demonstrated that the wording of the UN Charter has not defended separatist sentiments. In
terms of the founding articles, some scholars argue that the language of recognizing “the
principles of… self-determination,” indicates that self-determination is nothing more than a
principle and has therefore not elevated to the status of a human nor international right. (Quane
1998). In this regard, even the inclusion of self-determination in the UN Charter provides reasons
for both support and limitation of secession, depending on the reader’s interpretation.
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Unfortunately for national self-determination movements, international law has
historically been interpreted from the more restrictive perspective. Stemming from the idea that
international law tends to prohibit violence and only recognizes revolution or revolt as a means
of reclaiming former property (Margalit and Raz 1990), the Canadian Supreme Court ruled that
“the international law right to self-determination only generates, at best, a right to external selfdetermination in situations of former colonies” (“Secession of Quebec” 1998). Likewise,
scholars of international law say that the international community “recognizes no ‘right to selfdetermination’ for the purpose of unilateral secession” (Shen 2000). This conclusion from the
perspective of the international community is somewhat predictable, given that the leaders in the
community are, themselves, powerful representatives from large states that have an inherent
desire to maintain their sovereignty and territorial integrity.
In fact, a variety of definitions of national self-determination suggest that secession and
independence are inherently unilateral and without the consent of the international community.
For example, three frequently cited definitions of national self-determination and secession are
the following: 1) “the creation of a State by the use of threat of force without the consent of the
former sovereign,” (Crawford 2006); 2) “a special kind of territorial separatism… [that] is an
abrupt, unilateral move to independence on the part of the region that is a metropolitan territory
of a sovereign, independent state,” (Heraclides 1991); and 3) “the creation of a new, independent
entity through the separation of part of the territory… of an existing State, without the consent of
the latter” (Kohen 2006). Although these definitions vary in a number of ways, all of them are
consistent in arguing that secession is a unilateral act committed against a pre-existing sovereign.
Consequently, it is unlikely that these movements would receive support from a large community
of pre-existing sovereigns.
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However, many scholars often also recognize that there may be possibilities in which
unilaterally self-determination movements would be supported internationally as a limited right
in the case of “severe oppression by the parent state” (Adonu 2015). Nevertheless, the term,
“severe oppression by the parent state,” has yet to be defined nor applied universally, which
leaves room for continued debate and discussion over national self-determination movements
which claim that they were victimized by their respective state in some regard.
In general, the literature on national self-determination is rather indecisive. While it is
evidenced that a lack of formal laws exists to allow for the success of these self-determination
movements, that is not to say that these ideologies are doomed. In fact, the literature
demonstrates that the international community has implied the existence of the right under
certain conditions. Ultimately, national self-determination movements’ successes or failures in
drawing international sympathy will be determined by their effectiveness in demonstrating
definitive instances of abuse by the parent state.
National Self-Determination: Advancing Democracy or Reaching Populism
In addition to the politics of the international community, national self-determination
movements often face substantial resistance within their own state. A number of obstacles
prevent national self-determination movements from becoming too strong and attempt to
undermine their ideological values. For example, one common argument against national selfdetermination comes from those who critique it - not for its ideology or content - but rather for
its methods and course of action. Particularly in the case of republics or democracies, there are a
number of ways that institutions can change without complete secession, such as through
elections, constitutional amendments, and other forms of action within constitutional guidelines
(Lindsay and Wellman 2003). As such, the parent state is able to claim that there is a possibility

THE QUESTION OF NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION IN CATALONIA

Waugh 7

for the members of the independence movement to enact their political desires without corroding
the territorial unity of the state.
This is, of course, often unattainable for many independence movements, as they tend to
correspond to a single group inside of a larger population but would be obligated to obtain the
support from other peoples and regions within the state in order to access constitutional means of
change. In the end, the presence of virtually unattainable constitutional mechanisms for
increasing political power has the effect of reducing external support for the movements, while
also adding to the claims of victimization felt within the affected communities. However, this
also gives way to one of the most blatant paradoxes of national self-determination: Is the
movement searching to improve democracy or to destroy it?
Democracy is, in its simplest definition, the rule of the people, but, for practical purposes,
involves significantly more attributes. The first aspect of democracy is that it is liberal, meaning
that it is based on the rule of law, limited government, and the recognition of civil rights and
liberties. It is also a representative form of government - subject to fair and periodic elections for
public officials (Nielsen 2016). In this principle of representation, it is important to understand
that, while democracies attempt to follow “the will of the people,” they do not guarantee to
adhere to the will of all people. As a result, democracies do not always satisfy all members of
their communities and, instead, rely on their citizens accepting occasionally unfavorable
decisions in return for stability and the rule of law. This relationship between democracies and
their peoples becomes much more fragile in the presence of national self-determination because
said movements often seek to promote their policies even if it requires them to circumvent
societal order and elements of the parent state’s constitution.
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In some instances, this fragility manifests itself in steering the democracy towards
populist ways of thinking. Populism is defined as “a political program or movement that
champions the common person, usually by favorable contrast with an elite” (Munro 2019). It is
important to note that populism is not an ideology, such as fascism, socialism, liberalism, or
many other “-isms” that are so commonly discussed in politics. Quite the contrary to political
ideologies, denoting a movement, group, or thought as “populist” refers more so to the
articulation, themes, and rhetoric of the entity than to its actual agenda (Laclau 2005); therefore,
it is a description that can be applied to movements on both sides of the political spectrum.
In fact, history has demonstrated that populism can be either ideologically left or right,
depending on the movement from which it prevails. Some of the most obvious examples of rightwing populism come from the nationalist and fascist movements of twentieth century Europe.
According to retrospective studies of populist movements in both the beginning (Spanish
“Franquismo” and German Nazism) and end (French Front Nacional) of the twentieth century,
the far-right populist agenda tends to construct compelling narratives on the basis of
“ethnonationalist xenophobia” and “anti-political-establishment” skepticism (Rydgren 2005). In
other words, the core aspects that all of these movements shared was the identification of
foreigners and political elites as the enemy of the common people.
On the left side of the political spectrum, the movements of Canada’s Reform Party,
Venezuela’s Chavista groups, and Fujimori’s party in Peru have all demonstrated a similar
pattern of imposing centralized authority and the suppression of dissent in the guise of fighting
for the cause of the people, though, in these cases, in the direction of nominally egalitarian
policies and protectionist foreign policy (Akkerman 2012). In both situations, the movements
idolize the notion of “the common people” in the creation of both in and out groups to such an
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extent that members of these movements are willing to circumvent traditionally accepted
institutions and norms.
National self-determination movements are not immune to these patterns. As addressed
above, many supporters of national self-determination feel that the democratic processes in
standard democracies, which often require consensus throughout their entire parent state, are
unattainable. This may lead them to view the situation as one in which their surrounding area and
population desire an independence that is being withheld from them by the political elites or
other groups, thereby creating the us-them complexes of populist movements. Additionally, it
may lead these groups to advocate for the use of unilateral and locally performed means of
separating from the parent state, which silences dissenting opinions within the movements, and
challenges the authority of the democratic institutions of the larger state. As such, while not all
national self-determination movements are populist, the tendencies and sentiments generated by
their political desires can easily fall to populist characteristics.
National Self-Determination: Practical Application in Catalonia
History of Spanish-Catalonian Relations
In order to more closely examine national self-determination movements as well as
demonstrate distinct examples of the arguments made above, we will take the issue of the
Catalonian national self-determination movement as a case study. Catalonia is located on the
border of Spain and France and with a shore along the Mediterranean Sea. Under the Spanish
Constitution of 1978, the region was declared one of Spain’s 17 autonomous communities. Being
an autonomous community, Catalonia has enjoyed the right to control certain services, including
education and health care, independently from the other regions of the country; however, most
powers remain either shared or dependent on the national government. (Gladstone et al. 2017).
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The region as it is known today was also given a self-governing body, La Generalitat,
under the Spanish constitution on December 18, 1979 in order to administer and conduct these
affairs (Rodriguez 2019). Economically speaking, Catalonia is part of the regional financing
system of Spain, which means that revenue generated by the region is shared with the national
government and, in turn, redistributed throughout the country as necessary, making it inherently
dependent and subject to national rule; however, it is also notably the only region in all of Spain
to have exclusive control over culture and religion (Gladstone et al. 2017). As such, this
particular region distinguishes itself by already being, in part, institutionally separated from the
rest of its parent state. Additionally, the region is significant because of its longstanding
adversarial relationship with the rest of the larger country.
Sentiments for Catalonian independence date as far back in history as the Middle Ages.
While the majority of Spain’s history can be traced back to the expansion of the Kingdoms of
Castille y León during the Spanish reconquest, Catalonians have a tendency to argue that their
lineage and history stems from the Earldom of Catalonia (“Catalonia’s Bid…” 2019). Even after
these two states merged into one formal Kingdom, tensions over Spain’s rulers remained. In the
nineteenth century, the early death of King Ferdinand brought about a problem of legitimacy and
inheritance as the country split into supporters of Queen Isabel II (the daughter of King
Ferdinand) and Don Carlos (the king’s brother). In the end, Queen Isabel II rose to power upon
turning eighteen; however, the Catalonian people remained faithful to Don Carlos, causing an
initial wave of independence sentiments (Rodriguez 2019). More pushes for independence came
with the ascension of dictators Primo de Rivera and Francisco Franco, both of whom outlawed
special privileges that had historically been given to the Catalonian people (Ortiz 2012). Despite
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the fact that the country has now returned to a democratic structure, these questions of
independence have not faded.
Chronology of Recent Spanish-Catalonian Relations
Since the turn of the 2000s, Spanish-Catalonian tensions have only amplified. The first
major event to demonstrate these increasing conflicts on an institutional level occurred in a
judicial battle in 2006. On September 30, 2005, the Catalonian Parliament passed a bill to expand
the existing Statute of Autonomy under the Spanish Constitution of 1978 and later achieved
popular ratification of the new bill by means of a regional referendum. The new bill, which
consisted of over 30 articles aimed at expanding the power of the Generalitat, was then signed
into law at the regional level (“Catalonia’s Bid…” 2019). However, this unilateral display of
power expansion did not take well with the rest of the country, and shortly after the passage of
the bill, the Partido Popular, a conservative nationalist party, filed an appeal to the Spanish
Supreme Court.
After a lengthy and exhausting legal battle for both sides, the Spanish Supreme Court
ruled in favor of the Partido Popular, declaring that 14 of the articles were to be removed and
requiring another 27 to be re-interpreted and reviewed by Catalonian magistrates on case-by-case
bases each time the Generalitat wished to use the powers enumerated under the bill. The Court
also moved to abolish preferential status for the use of Catalan in mass media and in government
documents, and to restrict the “right of citizens to address constitutional bodies and the Spanish
judiciary in Catalan” (“Spanish Constitutional Court Cuts Back…” 2010). While the
conservative factions of the country were pleased with the decision - considering it a decision of
reason and unification - the rulings met heavy criticism in Catalonia, which caused further
fracturing between the region and its parent state as opposed to true unification.

THE QUESTION OF NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION IN CATALONIA

Waugh 12

Years later, in 2014, the Catalonian government launched a new approach to separation.
The Generalitat organized a referendum to ask citizens two questions – whether or not Catalonia
should be a state, and, if yes, whether or not it should be an independent state from the rest of
Spain (Kassam 2014). The referendum was almost immediately declared illegal by the federal
authorities in Madrid, being called “political propaganda…devoid of any kind of democratic
validity” (“Catalonia’s Bid…” 2019), but the vote nonetheless was carried out. After the results
were in, the referendum demonstrated that 80.7% of voters responded yes to both questions –
showing apparently overwhelming support for independence. However, the official records also
demonstrated that only about half of the region’s eligible population attended the vote, leaving
major questions about the true validity and authority of the referendum (Kassam 2014). In fact,
third-party opinion polls taken shortly after the referendum reported that Catalonians were
evenly split on their attitudes toward formally splitting from Spain (Burridge 2015).
Having been declared unconstitutional, the vote carried relatively little political weight;
however, the results helped to fuel popular support for the region’s pro-independence parties.
This manifested itself in the regional 2015 parliamentary elections in which pro-independence
parties won 1.9 million out of 4 million votes cast and gained a majority of seats in the region’s
parliament (Burridge 2015). As such, the separatist factions of the region, although representing
a slight minority of its constituents, rose to power on the promise of enacting a referendum for an
independent state.
In 2017, the pro-independence government in Catalonia attempted to do just that. Despite
results from a survey in July of 2017 which demonstrated that only 41.1% of Catalonians
supported independence (Burgen 2017), the government moved to hold a referendum. This
referendum, announced in September, was declared illegal by the Spanish government, as it
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attempted to change the constitution of Spain without holding votes in the other regions of Spain
(Burridge 2015). On the first of October (L’1-O in Catalan), the vote was held. Over 90% of
those who voted demonstrated a desire for independence. However, this vote was boycotted by
anti-separatists, leaving the voter turnout rate at approximately 42.3%, or less than half of the
region’s eligible voters (O’Sullivan 2017). All the while, the Civil Guard, a police-like force sent
from Madrid, was sent to stop the vote, which led to many physical altercations. In the end, the
region was left confused as to what to do, as their government had been dissolved by the federal
government and many of their leaders were detained (Will 2020). Although this chronology
paints a picture of the relationship between Catalonia and the rest of Spain, it by no means
provides a full understanding of the many other factors at play.
The Political Dimension of Catalan Self-Determination
In addition to a consequential view of the national self-determination movement, there is
also a political dimension to the issue that has changed over the course of the movement’s
history. This political analysis focuses on the general forces that lead people to form proindependence attitudes in the context of the debate. Interestingly enough, aspects of both leftwing liberalism and right-wing nationalism created a basis for some form of pro-secession
ideology (Moore 2003). In the earlier years of Catalonian independence, for example, from the
17th century up until approximately 1925, many Catalonian nationalists supported the absolute
monarch, Carlos V (Rodriguez 2019). These nationalists, with mostly anti-liberal and strong
Roman Catholic beliefs, sharply opposed growing liberal movements in Madrid and desired to
maintain a decentralized government controlled by the Catalonian “nation.” However, after the
dictators Primo de Rivera and Francisco Franco banned Catalonian language and independence
movements, a second wave of secular, liberal-leaning school of thought for independence
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emerged – emphasizing progressive ideals of justice and democracy (Rodriguez 2019 and Moore
2003).
In the current make-up of the national self-determination movement, supporters from
both sides of the political spectrum, stemming from these two distinct schools of thought and
distinct preferences of values, can be found. Furthermore, this issue, which both unites otherwise
opposing parties while also dividing people who would otherwise be ideologically similar, has
amounted to be a second political division, meaning that voters strongly identify themselves both
in terms of liberal versus conservative as well as separatists versus unionists, increasing political
fragmentation and legislative difficulty for all those involved.
The Economic Dimension of Catalan Self-Determination
Another important aspect in this dispute is based around economics. In the eyes of the
Catalonian separatists, the region provides far more in national revenue than it receives.
According to recent data, they are correct in saying that a disparity exists. The region, which
includes approximately 7.5 million inhabitants (Rodriguez 2019), or about 16 percent of the
country, generates over 19 percent of Spain’s GDP while receiving only about 15 percent of the
total benefits redistributed throughout the country, equating to what they calculate to be net loss
of nearly 16 million euros each year after subtracting the amount of benefits received from the
total amount of taxes paid to the Spanish government (Ortiz 2012). Other reports also
demonstrate that, per capita, Catalonians make more than most other Spaniards, second only to
the Autonomous Community of Madrid (“Spanish Regional Accounts” 2019). In fact, even
major Catalonian economists, such as Elisenda Paluzie, Dean of the Economics and Business
School at the University of Barcelona, go as far as to say, “even if it had to pay for its own
military and diplomatic corps, the financial benefit to Catalonia would be equivalent to seven
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percent of its GDP” (Ortiz 2012). As such, one must recognize that the Catalonian’s claims to
higher production and lower federal payouts in comparison to other regions in the country are
factually correct. On the other hand, the conclusions that Catalonia would be better off as a
separate country and that it, as a region, is being taken advantage of are both questionable.
Unfortunately for the national self-determination movement, the economic arguments
presented in its favor are significantly less compelling than they might appear. In general terms,
there are a number of situations world-wide in which a rich area or internal region of a country
generates more into the federal budget than others. Examples of these situations can be found in
many developed countries in Europe and even in the United States (Kapur and Smith 2020; Ortiz
2012). In a more finite analysis of their claims, research also suggests that the disparity between
Catalonia and the rest of Spain is on par with average disparities between other regions
throughout Europe and their respective parent countries. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, which examined 30 of the world’s richest countries, showed that
Spain had a comparatively low level of regional economic disparity, reporting, “Over the last
sixteen years, differences between the regions of Spain in terms of GDP per capita remained
stable at low levels… Only four out of 30 OECD countries with comparable data record lower
regional economic disparities than Spain” (“Regions and Cities…” 2018). In this sense, the
separatists’ claims that the Spanish government abuses them and/or exploits Catalonia appear to
be an exaggerated complaint and fuel for motivated reasoning. Interestingly enough, this
situation also demonstrates a certain element of populism, in that it attempts to form a narrative
in which there is a parasitic relationship between the community and the outsider rest of Spain
without regard for traditionally accepted redistributive policies.
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Additionally, even if Catalonia were able to recover the money that it pays in taxes to the
Spanish government, a separation would be far more detrimental to the Catalonian GDP than
beneficial. Firstly, the regional product generated in Catalonia is substantial, but would likely be
damaged by any kind of separation given that 35.5% of Catalonian exports are sent into Spain’s
national market (Bosch 2017). Likewise, major leaders in the European Union have indicated
that, in the case of Catalonian secession, the new state would need to reapply to be a member
state of the EU which could possibly take a significant amount of time or even be blocked
entirely by the Spanish government, thereby sealing the new country off from another one of its
major markets and trading partners (Ortiz 2012). Lastly, there is a large question as to whether or
not Catalonia, upon separation, would be required to pay off a portion of the Spanish national
debt to reflect the amount that it had borrowed as a region. Economists suggest that all of these
factors could cause the Catalonian GDP to shrink by as much as thirty percent and double its
unemployment rate (Bosch 2017). In this regard, although economic disparities are a motivating
factor in the national self-determination movement, the economic feasibility of formal separation
is bleak at best, and leaders should be careful to fully examine and prepare economic recovery
plans if they plan to seek independence.
Despite the questionable validity of the Catalonians’ economic arguments, understanding
the history of commercial relations between the region and the parent country are paramount to
explaining the re-emergence of a national self-determination movement. In addition to the
aforementioned Supreme Court case’s influence on raising pro-independence attitudes, the
economic turmoil of 2008 heightened economic tensions between the two parties. Following this
global crisis, multiple sources indicated that the tighter budgets placed on regional governments
across Spain, coupled with the reductions in pay and soaring unemployment rates, notably
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contributed to a widespread feeling that the central government was to blame (Ortiz 2012, Bosch
2017 and “Catalonia’s Bid…” 2019). While Catalonia was not the only area affected by these
hardships, the economic downturn, in effect, cemented distrust towards the national government
in Madrid, paving the way for greater levels of paranoia and a yearning for separation in the
hearts of Catalonians.
The Cultural Dimension of Catalan Self-Determination
Finally, the last of the major arguments presented by Catalonian separatists, alongside
historic disputes and economic inequalities, is that of cultural differences between Catalonia and
the rest of Spain. For example, in Catalonia, primary and secondary school-aged students devote
12 times more hours to teaching Catalan language than to teaching Spanish (Will 2020).
Catalonia outlawed bullfighting in 2010 (Ortiz 2012), which also demonstrated a desire to show
a fundamental difference in culture. Some members of the movement have even gone as far as to
assert that Catalonian people are genetically and historically more similar to Italian and French
people than to other Spaniards (Will 2020). Nonetheless, anti-separatists in other regions of
Spain point out that in the original creation of the current Spanish constitution, a referendum was
held in which 90.5% of Catalonians approved of the nation as “indivisible” with a 70% turnout
rate, demonstrating higher support than in Madrid or in any other region (Will 2020). Likewise,
the notion that the Catalonian people are culturally different from the rest of Spain implies that
the Catalonians are, themselves, culturally unified.
This, however, is largely untrue. In reality, 2.6 million out of the 7.5 million people in
Catalonia were born in other countries or in other regions of Spain (Verdú 2015), indicating that
Catalonia is not as uniform as these arguments may assert. In fact, the immigrant and migrant
population in Catalonia consists of approximately 1.6 million people with the right to vote, 43.2
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percent of whom have reported a desire to “keep things as they are” in terms of possible
secession whereas only 25.6 percent of them support the national self-determination movement
(Verdú 2015).
Regardless of how these immigrants vote, one thing is clear: the pro-independence parties
and other groups have to recognize in their arguments the cultural and ethnic diversity of
Catalonia. At present, the focus of the movement on presenting Catalonians to be a Catalanspeaking, regionally distinct, ethnic group is inherently exclusionary towards these immigrants,
which may lead to decline in that voting bloc’s support for separation. Furthermore, the emphasis
on Catalonian nationals teeters on populist, in that it largely neglects the need to recognize
diversity and dissenting opinions among sizeable minorities.
The Catalan Independence Movement Today
Nowadays, the Catalonian national independence movement marches forward but has a
new set of obstacles to face. In response to the 2017 referendum, federal officials sent the
national guard to quell what was considered to be an unconstitutional uprising. As the national
guard fought against Catalonian people to close polling locations and stop the Catalonian
government, various leaders of the Generalitat were arrested, incarcerated, and initially charged
with violating the constitution and for inciting rebellion, which, combined, carried a potential jail
time of 25 years (O’Sullivan 2019). In the end, 12 of the most influential leaders in the
organization of the referendum were charged with various crimes from sedition to misuse of
public funds, but none of them were found guilty of rebellion (Minder 2019). Perhaps the most
devastating consequences of the referendum came with the loss of the region’s president, Carles
Puidgemont, who fled to Belgium in an act of self-imposed exile to avoid Spanish prosecution,
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and of the region’s vice president, Oriol Junqueras, who was given the longest prison sentence:
12 years (O’Sullivan 2019 and Will 2020).
The prison sentences once again fueled anti-Madrid sentiments in Catalonia, which
ultimately led to yet another uprising in November of 2019. Influenced by democratic protests in
Hong Kong, nearly 25,000 protesters filled the metro system and major plazas in Barcelona and
even more protesters gathered at the city’s airport, all with the intention of disrupting transit and
flights in order to elicit news coverage and a response from the federal government (O’Sullivan
2019). The protesters were successful in their attempts to disrupt traffic, as over 100 flights were
canceled by various airlines in one single day (Minder 2019). However, this success was
accompanied by severe backlash from the government. Police forces from Madrid were once
again sent into the city with batons and foam bullets. Various incidents between the police and
the protesters resulted in 131 people requiring medical assistance, including one man who lost an
eye after being shot by one of the bullets (O’Sullivan 2019).
Certainly after the police response in 2017, the protesters knew what to expect and
prepare for, but many were ready to accept physical damage in hopes of gaining international
sympathy. At present, no European countries have taken further action to support the
Catalonians’ cause. In fact, the 2019 protests may have had adverse effects on the movement’s
success, as only 42.5% of Catalonians supported pro-independence parties in the elections
following shortly after these protests (Will 2020), which resulted in said parties losing their
ability to form a coalition government.
Outside of Catalonia, the political turmoil and routine protests have also had effects on
the make-up of the Spanish Parliament. During the time after the 2017 referendum, arguments on
the federal level about how to respond to the national self-determination movement intensified
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the divide between the left- and right-wing parties of Spain (Penty 2019). While right-wing
parties preferred a hardline solution to the issue and pushed for the dissolution of Catalonia’s
Statute of Independence, the left-wing parties saw an opportunity to seize power by forming a
coalition with Catalonian pro-independence parties in order to reach a compromise and gain a
majority in the Parliament.
However, this strategy of uniting with the separatists had major backlash from the more
right-leaning parties. Perhaps the greatest effect of this backlash can be seen in the growth of
Spain’s most conservative party, Vox. The party, which held just 24 seats in the Parliament
before the 2019 elections, grew to have 52 seats (Hedgecoe 2019), which now makes them the
third largest party in Spanish politics (Penty 2019). While 52 out of 350 total seats in parliament
is by no means a majority, the fact that the party has nearly doubled in size demonstrates the
growing tensions within Spain’s autonomous communities outside of Catalonia and makes the
Vox party extremely influential in the event that a conservative coalition government should
form.
Conclusions
As shown above, the conflict between the Catalonian people and the rest of Spain is a
complicated one, full of distinct arguments, manifesting itself on various occasions in the form of
physical altercations. Scattered throughout the many events and issues in the Catalonian national
self-determination debate are three main areas when analyzing the validity of the separatists’
arguments: the economy, culture, and politics. However, attempting to further examine these
arguments in terms of their abilities to bring about internationally recognized and longstanding
political change requires us to return to the central, theoretical basis of national selfdetermination movements: democracy. Curiously enough, while the pro-independence groups of
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Catalonia claim to have a more perfect version of democracy, the truth is that their movement
and arguments demonstrate anti-democratic tendencies.
These anti-democratic tendencies can be seen in many aspects of the movement. Firstly,
we see that the Catalonian separatists place a significant amount of importance on voting and on
self-determination, but relatively little importance on the constitutionality of said votes nor on
representing the entire region. For example, reviewing the votes cast in both 2014 and 2017, one
observes that Spanish official authorities had declared the votes unconstitutional well in advance
and warned that guards would be sent to control the referendum, should it occur (Burgen 2017).
In the case of the 2014 vote, reports indicate that the Catalonian government “knew that [the
vote] would be controversial and complicated” (Burridge 2015). In both instances, the
government, despite promises to protect Catalonians, knowingly placed its citizens at risk of
physical harm and legal persecution in an effort to create a political stunt.
Likewise, the government following the 2015 election was a pro-independence
government that had a majority in the Catalonian Parliament but had lost the popular vote. In this
regard, an official, a democratically conducted regional vote had already been conducted and
showed a very clear degree of ambivalence in terms of voters’ attitudes towards the question of
independence, but the government pushed forward, claiming a mandate to hold the referendum
in the face of the perceived obstacles.
Finally, the movement has yet to address the question of immigrants and the status of
foreign-born peoples in their otherwise nationalist society. In order to truly convince the
international community that Catalonian independence would promote democratic practices in
the region, the movement must re-examine its efforts and actions in order to avoid being
considered a populist or democratically flawed concept.
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In addition to internal issues, the movement also faces two external obstacles in its path
to international recognition. Generally speaking, these obstacles stem from a desire for
international stability. Based on the current precedents in international law, secession is only
recognized when there are clear abuses of the parent state against a specific region.
Acknowledging Catalonian national self-determination inherently admits that regions, even
without credible claims to abuse, do, in fact, have a right to self-determination. In recognizing
said right, the international community expands the conditions under which secession is
permitted, thus opening itself up to potential instability, as alliances between Spain and any
country to concede sovereignty to Catalonia would likely be tense if not ruined entirely.
Additionally, giving Catalonia independent status would justify other national selfdetermination movements such as Brexit, thereby leading to widespread international
fragmentation. The recognition of Catalonia as a state would also be a detriment to the stability
of international law, as it would serve to counteract previous international cases that restricted
the right of self-determination in other cases. Finally, given the potentially devastating effects
that Catalonian independence would have on Catalonia’s economy, recognizing the region as a
state would imply that the international community, or at least the supporting countries, would
have to accept some form of responsibility for assuring that the country does not immediately
collapse and require development aid to be redirected into Catalonia. Overall, the international
community has fairly little incentive to acknowledge Catalonian self-determination.
These issues in the Catalonian crisis are not necessarily unique to Catalonia. Although
not all national self-determination movements throughout the world involve such a tumultuous
chain of events or as intense of a cultural divide, the general factors that propel the movement as
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well as those that prevent it from gaining international support are seen in most other national
self-determination cases.
Nevertheless, it is, in theory, not impossible for national self-determination to one day
come to fruition if a movement were able to resolve the problems inhibiting its success. The first
requirement would be that it can demonstrate a true desire for heightened democracy. In order to
do this, the movement would likely need to involve a vast array of ethnic groups and propose a
clearly defined constitution or governing documents to institute upon separation. By
incorporating some degree of diversity both demographically and institutionally, the movement
can strengthen its cause by avoiding being cast aside as an ethnic uprising. The separating group
must also be able to demonstrate an ability to survive the separation both economically and
politically, meaning that the region must be free of possible complications in trade deals and
questions of legitimacy. Perhaps most importantly, the movement must be able to demonstrate
that it is inherently different from other national self-determination groups in order to give the
international community a clear reason to support that particular movement while still reasonably
denying others.
In any case, there are many lessons to be learned in the case of Catalonian national selfdetermination. It provides a clear representation of how the theoretical forces identified by many
secession movements play out in a real-world situation, and may, in effect, establish a precedent
for the fate of national self-determination movements in general for years to come. As such, it is
of the utmost importance that Catalonian nationals, Spanish anti-separatists, and the international
community alike carefully consider their courses of action to avoid falling into the pitfalls of
populism or polarization.
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